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 Non-technical summary 
 
The importance of market entry for competition and innovation is largely undisputed in the 
field of industrial organisation. Following the well-known methodology of Paul Geroski 
(1991, 1995), this importance is based on two major roles of entry: as an equilibrium force in 
that it competes away excess profits to an equilibrium level (so-called imitative entry) and as 
a disequilibrium force which propels the industry from one equilibrium state to another due to 
the introduction and diffusion of innovations (so-called innovative entry).  
The U.S. airline industry can act as a prime example for the relevance of both types of 
entry. On the one hand, since the deregulation of the industry in 1978 imitative entry into 
many routes significantly increased competitive pressures and forced the traditional network 
carriers to increase their productive efficiency leading to lower fares and better service on 
many routes. On the other hand, deregulation allowed the appearance and growth of low-cost 
carriers who challenge the traditional network carriers with various forms of innovative entry.  
Against this background, we use T-100 traffic data and DB1B fare data from the U.S. 
Department of Transportation to identify patterns and effects of entry by network carriers and 
low-cost carriers in non-stop U.S. airline markets. For the sample period from 1996 to 2009, 
we find significant entry activity for both network carriers and low-cost carriers. However, 
while the network carriers showed substantial entry activity between 1996 and 2000, the 
average number of entries dropped significantly from 2003 onwards. Since 2004, the group of 
low-cost carriers entered more markets per year than the group of network carriers. In 
addition, the analysis revealed that low-cost carrier entries have significantly higher survival 
rates than entries by network carriers. 
With respect to the effects of entry, we apply two different approaches: a descriptive 
approach which studies the effects of all entry events in the TOP 500 non-stop U.S. airline 
markets and an econometric approach which investigates the effects of entry into existing 
non-stop markets for selected LCCs and NWCs separately by using logarithmic fixed effects 
regressions. We find that entry activity of low-cost carriers did not only experience significant 
absolute increases but also led to substantial fare reductions. As route entries by network 
carriers do not have comparable effects, the existence and expansion of low-cost carriers must 
be considered as the main driver of (price) competition in the domestic U.S. airline industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Die herausragende Bedeutung von Marktzutritt für Wettbewerb und Innovation gilt als 
unumstritten im Bereich der Industrieökonomik. Folgt man der vielfach zitierten 
Methodologie von Paul Geroski (1991, 1995), so gründet sich diese Bedeutung insbesondere 
auf zwei zentrale Funktionen von Marktzutritt: als eine gleichgewichtsschaffende Kraft in 
dem Sinne, dass Marktzutritt bestehende Gewinne wegkonkurriert (sog. imitativer 
Marktzutritt) und als gleichgewichtszerstörende Kraft indem durch Markteintritt neue 
Innovationen eingeführt werden (sog. innovationsgetriebener Marktzutritt). 
 Die U.S.-amerikanische Luftverkehrsindustrie kann als ein Paradebeispiel der Bedeutung 
beider Funktionen von Marktzutritt angesehen werden. Auf der einen Seite sorgte imitativer 
Marktzutritt seit der Deregulierung des US-Luftverkehrs im Jahre 1978 dafür, dass der 
Wettbewerbsdruck auf vielen Streckenmärkten anstieg und somit die traditionellen 
Fluggesellschaften gezwungen wurden, ihre produktive Effizienz zu verbessern und auf diese 
Weise für niedrigere Flugpreise und besseren Service zu sorgen. Auf der anderen Seite 
erlaubte die Deregulierung die Gründung und das Wachstum von Billigfluggesellschaften, die 
die traditionellen Fluggesellschaften mit verschiedenen Formen des innovationsgetriebenen 
Marktzutritts herausfordern.  
 Vor diesem Hintergrund verwenden wir Verkehrs- und Preisdaten des US-amerikanischen 
Verkehrsministeriums für eine Identifikation der Muster und Effekte von Marktzutritten 
traditioneller Fluggesellschaften sowie von Billigfluggesellschaften in inländische US-
Direktflugverbindungen. Für die Untersuchungsperiode von 1996 bis 2009 stellen wir eine 
signifikante Eintrittsaktivität für beide Typen von Fluggesellschaften fest. Während allerdings 
die traditionellen Fluggesellschaften zwischen 1996 und 2000 eine verstärkte Eintrittsaktivität 
aufweisen, sinkt deren Anzahl an Marktzutritten spürbar ab dem Jahr 2003. Beginnend mit 
dem Jahr 2004 verzeichnet die Gruppe der Billigfluggesellschaften jährlich mehr 
Marktzutritte als die traditionellen Fluggesellschaften. Darüber hinaus stellen wir fest, dass 
Markteintritte von Billigfluggesellschaften im Durchschnitt erfolgreicher waren (gemessen in 
so genannten Überlebensraten) als die entsprechenden Marktzutritte der traditionellen 
Fluggesellschaften.    
   Die Effekte von Marktzutritt betrachten wir zum einen mit Hilfe eines deskriptiven 
Ansatzes, der die Effekte aller Marktzutritte in den 500 größten Luftverkehrsmärkten 
untersucht. Des Weiteren kommt ein ökonometrischen Ansatz zum Einsatz, der die Effekte 
von Marktzutritt für ausgewählte traditionelle Fluggesellschaften und Billigfluggesellschaften 
mit Hilfe sogenannter fixed effects-Regressionen untersucht. Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
die Marktzutritte von Billigfluggesellschaften nicht nur absolut im Zeitablauf angestiegen 
sind, sondern insbesondere, dass sie zu substantiellen Preissenkungen geführt haben. Da für 
die Marktzutritte der traditionellen Fluggesellschaften keine vergleichbaren Effekte gefunden 
wurden, muss die Existenz und das Wachstum der Billigfluggesellschaften als der wesentliche 
Treiber des (Preis-) Wettbewerbs im US-amerikanischen Luftverkehrsmarkt angesehen 
werden.    
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1 Introduction 
The importance of market entry for competition and innovation is largely undisputed in the 
field of industrial organisation. On the one hand, entry plays a crucial role as an equilibrium 
force in that it competes away excess profits to an equilibrium level. Such imitative entry 
occurs when the entrant can reap profits by copying the established firms product or method 
of production. On the other hand, entry also plays a creative role in markets, serving as a 
vehicle for the introduction and diffusion of innovations. Such innovative entry occurs when 
the entrant either finds new ways to saturate a certain customer’s need or is able to produce a 
given product with less input. Innovative entry is seen as a disequilibrium force which propels 
the industry from one equilibrium state to another (see Geroski, 1991, 1995).   
The U.S. airline industry can act as a prime example for the relevance of both types of 
entry. On the one hand, since the deregulation of the industry in 1978, imitative entry into 
many routes significantly increased competitive pressures and forced the traditional network 
carriers to increase their productive efficiency leading to lower fares and better service on 
many routes. On the other hand, deregulation allowed the appearance and growth of low-cost 
carriers who challenge the traditional network carriers with various forms of innovative entry. 
This unique combination of regulation and deregulation together with the presence of 
imitative and innovative entry makes the U.S. airline industry a prime candidate for a closer 
examination of the role of market entry. This general interest is increased further by the 
absence of studies on patterns and effects of entry that take both types of significant recent 
market developments into account: severe external shocks, such as the attacks on 11 
September 2001 or the recent economic recession, and severe internal shocks such as the 
mergers of American Airlines and Trans World Airlines in 2001 or Delta Airlines and 
Northwest Airlines in 2008.  
Against this background, we use T-100 traffic data and DB1B fare data from the U.S. 
Department of Transportation to identify patterns and effects of entry by network carriers and 
low-cost carriers in non-stop U.S. airline markets. For the sample period from 1996 to 2009, 
we find that entry activity of low-cost carriers did not only experience significant absolute 
increases but also led to substantial fare reductions. As route entries by network carriers do 
not have comparable effects, the existence and expansion of low-cost carriers must be 
considered as the main driver of competition in the domestic U.S. airline industry. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The subsequent second section 
provides a review of the existing literature on particularly the effects of entry in U.S. airline 
markets. Subsequently, the third section derives and discusses new evidence on entry patterns 
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in the domestic U.S. airline industry between 1996 and 2009. In addition to the study of entry 
events in all non-stop airport-pair markets, we distinguish entries with respect to the type of 
market and length of haul. In the fourth section, the focus turns from the patterns of entry to 
the effects of entry. In particular, new evidence on the effects of non-stop route entry between 
1996 and 2009 is derived by applying two different approaches: a descriptive approach which 
studies the effects of all entry events of network carriers (NWCs) and low-cost carriers 
(LCCs) in the TOP 500 non-stop U.S. airline markets and an econometric approach which 
investigates the effects of entry into existing non-stop markets for selected LCCs and NWCs 
separately by using logarithmic fixed effects regressions. Section five concludes the article 
with a summary of the key insights and the derivation of important policy conclusions.  
2 Review of the existing literature 
The liberalization of the U.S. airline industry in 1978 together with the availability of (route-
level) traffic and fare data collected by the U.S. Department of Transportation provides a 
fruitful environment for empirical research. With respect to market entry, the existing 
literature can broadly be subdivided into two strands: the 'determinants of entry' literature and 
the 'effects of entry' literature. While the former set of articles investigates the key drivers of 
airlines’ decisions to enter particular routes by either estimating structural models (see, e.g., 
Berry (1992), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Dunn (2008)) or – following a reduced form 
approach – estimating the likelihood of entry as a function of firm and market characteristics 
(see, e.g., Boguslaski et al. (2004), Lederman and Januszewski (2003), Sinclair (1995)), the 
'effects of entry' literature can be subdivided further into studies of the general effects of entry 
and studies with a particular focus on the incumbents’ reactions to entry. Given the focus of 
this article, the remainder of this section concentrates on a review of articles belonging to the 
empirical ‘effects of entry’ literature. 
The earlier studies on the general effects of entry basically investigate the impact of route 
entries of particular low-cost carriers on fares and passenger numbers. For example, Whinston 
and Collins (1992) investigate route-level entries of the low-cost carrier People Express and 
find that entry on average caused a drop in the mean fare of 34 percent in 15 airport-pairs 
between 1984 and 1985. Windle and Dresner (1995) follow a similar research question and 
investigate the effects of route entry by Southwest Airlines on fares and passenger numbers. 
Based on a data set for the period from 1991 to 1994, they find an average price decline of 48 
percent, accompanied by an average increase in passenger numbers of 200 percent. 
In addition to studies that concentrate on the direct price and quantity effects of (low-cost) 
entry, several studies take a broader perspective and investigate the impact of low-cost 
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carriers on airport and route competition. Most prominently, a study by Dresner et al. (1996) 
extends previous research by analysing the impact of low-cost entry on, first, carriers 
operating on other routes at the airport where entry occurred and, second, the impact of low-
cost entry on carriers operating at airports in close proximity to the airport where entry 
occurred. The authors find that low-cost carrier entry on a route caused significant spill-over 
effects on both types of adjacent routes in a range of 8 to 45 percent lower average fares (for 
the case of Southwest Airlines). These results suggest that the real consumer benefits of low-
cost carrier entry and competition are significantly larger than previously thought by focusing 
on the direct effects of entry into the respective airport-pairs. 
Morrison (2001) builds on Dresner et al.'s (1996) approach to actually estimate the 
consumer savings of the presence of Southwest Airlines in U.S. airline markets. Based on an 
original set of competition variables, he finds that the savings due to actual, adjacent, and 
potential competition from Southwest sum up to USD 12.9 billion. Southwest's low fares 
were directly responsible for USD 3.4 billion of these savings to passengers. The remaining 
USD 9.5 billion represent the effect that actual, adjacent, and potential competition from 
Southwest had on other carriers' fares.  
In addition to contributions that investigate the route-level entry effects of single carriers, 
several studies provide a broader perspective. In a rather descriptive article, Joskow et al. 
(1994) examine quarterly data for 27 major, non-stop city pairs in the US between 1985 and 
1987 and generally find that entry reduces fares and increases output. In particular, the 
authors conclude that entry reduced yield by on average about 9.2 percent and led to a 
corresponding increase in the number of passengers of about 56 percent. In a recent study, 
Brueckner et al. (2011) investigate the general effects of entry and specifically introduce a 
differentiation of the fare effects between network carriers and low-cost carriers. Based on a 
data-set consisting of four quarters for the period from 2007 and 2008, the authors conclude 
that "[t]he presence of in-market, nonstop LCC competition reduces fares by as much as 34 
percent in the nonstop markets, and adjacent LCC competition in these markets reduces fares 
by as much as 20 percent" (Brueckner et al. (2011), p. 4). The effect of a second network 
carrier in nonstop markets is substantially smaller, reducing fares by at most 5.3 percent. 
Adding a third network carrier has no significant further effect on fares. Interestingly, the 
authors also find that the small competitive effect of entry by legacy carriers is a fairly recent 
phenomenon and might be explained by, first, the widening price discipline resulting from 
lower LCC costs and rapid LCC expansion, second, the greater price transparency due to 
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Internet-based airline search and, third, changes in corporate buying patterns and travel 
policies.  
In addition to the ‘general effects of entry’ literature, a complementary set of articles 
specifically investigates the incumbents’ reactions to (typically low-cost) entry. Most 
prominently, a recent study by Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) investigates how incumbents 
respond to the threat of entry by competitors (as distinct from how they respond to actual 
entry). They find that incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by Southwest's 
entry; over half of Southwest's total impact on incumbent fares occurs before Southwest starts 
flying. A study by Daraban and Fournier (2008) comes to comparable results. Incumbents are 
found to significantly reduce fares both before and after the entry of a low-cost carrier. The 
fare reductions are stronger for Southwest Airlines than for other low-cost carriers. The 
authors also find that the post-entry fare adjustment process takes place fairly quickly 
reaching the new equilibrium one or two quarters after entry. 
Complementary to the more strategy-oriented articles on the incumbent’s reactions to 
entry, several researchers aim at connecting incumbent’s reactions to entry with forms of 
anticompetitive behaviour such as especially predatory practices. For example, Lin et al. 
(2002) conducted an investigation of factors contributing to competitive reactions to entry by 
incumbent airlines in the short and longer runs. Using data on 889 incumbent reactions to 
entry between 1991 and 1997, the authors identify several factors that have a significant 
impact on the level of incumbent price cuts in response to entry. They include the size of the 
entrant's price cut, the number of passengers carried by the new entrant on the route, and the 
costs, size and number of complaints of the entrant. Interestingly, Lin et al. (2002) find no 
evidence that incumbents respond more aggressively to small, low-cost carriers than to other 
carriers. Incumbents reserve their largest price cuts for larger new entrants with higher costs. 
The longer-run results of this study indicate that even if the entrant is forced to withdraw from 
a route, prices do not rise to pre-entry levels.  
Dresner and Windle (2000) specifically seek evidence for predatory responses of network 
carriers to low-cost carrier entry. In particular, they investigate whether network carriers 
respond more aggressively to entry by small carriers and whether smaller entrants fail more 
often than network carriers. The authors find little evidence for predatory behaviour of 
network carriers against smaller low-cost carriers. Ito and Lee (2004) analyse the responses of 
incumbent network carriers to low-cost carrier entry on routes served to and from their hubs 
between 1991 and 2002. The authors not only find that highly aggressive incumbent reactions 
are the exception rather than the rule, but also that the median response by network carriers to 
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low-cost carrier entry at their hubs is found to be fairly accommodating, i.e. incumbents often 
align their fare to the entrant’s fare but they rarely undercut the entrant. Furthermore, Ito and 
Lee (2004) find no evidence that the incumbent’s price or capacity reaction to low-cost carrier 
entry has a negative impact on the probability of exit of the entrant.  
Last but not least, Bamberger and Carlton (2006) study the price responses of network 
carriers following low-cost carrier entry. As the other studies mentioned above, Bamberger 
and Carlton (2006) also fail to find empirical support for a predatory response of network 
carriers in the aftermath of low-cost carrier entry. On the contrary, the authors find, first, that 
most low-cost carrier entries were successful, second, incumbent carriers’ average fares 
typically did not fall substantially after low-cost entry, and, third, incumbent carriers’ average 
fares typically did not increase substantially after low-cost carrier exit. 
Given this foray through the existing literature, our article aims at contributing to the 
‘general effects of entry’ strand of research. In addition to the provision of new evidence on 
the patterns and effects of entry for a large data set comprising the entire period from 1996 to 
2009, our econometric approach allows us to derive the effects of entry caused by different 
airlines and consequently also provides new insights from a competitive strategy perspective. 
3 Patterns of entry into non-stop U.S. airline markets from 1996 to 2009 
Following the review of the existing literature, this section provides new evidence on the 
patterns of entry into non-stop U.S. airline markets between 1996 and 2009. In addition to the 
study of entry events by network carriers (NWCs) and low-cost carriers (LCCs) in non-stop 
airport-pair markets, we distinguish entries with respect to the type of market and length of 
haul.1  
The empirical analysis in this and the forthcoming fourth section is based on the U.S. DOT 
T-100 Domestic Segment database. We constructed a data-set of non-directional non-stop 
route airport-pair markets.2 We dropped airline-route observations with less than 12 quarterly 
departures and airline-route observations which were only served one quarter between 1995 
                                                 
1  The following carriers are classified as LCCs: Southwest Airlines, AirTran Airways, JetBlue Airways, 
Allegiant Air, Frontier Airlines, Spirit Airlines, Sun Country Airlines and Virgin America. All other (non-
regional) airlines in the T-100 Domestic Segment database were classified as NWCs. The group of NWCs is 
typically supported by a larger group of regional airlines. Most of those smaller airlines operate in small 
feeder traffic markets and often assist one particular network carrier in the operation of its hub-and-spoke 
network. Although most of these regional carriers are legally independent, their economic existence is often 
tied to a large network carrier. For example, in most instances, regional carriers do not issue their own tickets 
but refer to the network carrier for all flight bookings. In the empirical analysis of entry patterns and effects 
of entry, regional airlines are excluded from the analysis. 
2  Although there are good reasons for applying both market delineation concepts – airport-pairs and city-pairs 
– we follow the more conservative approach of airport-pairs. Every effect found on an airport-pair level is 
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and 2009. An entry is determined by the quarter when we first observe an airline providing 
non-stop scheduled services. Since our data begins in 1995, all airlines enter by definition in 
1995. Thus, we have to restrict our entry analysis on the time frame from 1996 to 2009. Fare 
data – used in Section 4 below – is retrieved from the Origin and Destination Survey DB1B 
Market database. In calculating average fares, zero fares, abnormally high fares and fares 
which required the passenger to change the airplane more than twice were excluded from the 
data-set. Finally, information on population and unemployment rates was received from the 
U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics. 
3.1 Entry into non-stop airport-pair markets 
A natural starting point of the study of entry patterns is a general analysis of all entry events 
on the non-stop airport-pair level. In this respect, T-100 Domestic Segment Data analysis 
reveals that the overall number of routes operated by commercial airlines increased from 
1,962 routes in 1995 to 2,658 routes in 2009. These numbers alone suggest a significant entry 
activity in the sample period. This finding is basically confirmed by Figure 1 which plots the 
number of route entries by NWCs and LCCs.  
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Figure 1: Number of route entries by NWCs and LCCs (all markets, 1996-2009) 
Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, authors’ calculations 
 
As shown in Figure 1, there are substantial differences in both the absolute number of entry 
events per year and the shares of entry events between NWCs and LCCs. On an absolute 
level, there have been on average 167 market entries per year with the years 2007 (244 
entries) and 2003 (105 entries) delineating the value spectrum for the sample period. Focusing 
                                                                                                                                                        
expected to be even more pronounced on a city-pair level. For a detailed discussion of airport-pairs vs. city-
pairs, see Brueckner et al. (2010).  
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on the separation between NWCs and LCCs, the former group has launched entry into 1,205 
markets between 1996 and 2009, while the entry activities of the latter group add up to 1,137 
entry events. While the NWCs show significant entry activity between 1996 and 2000, the 
number of entries dropped significantly from 2003 onwards. Interestingly, since 2004 the 
group of LCCs has entered more markets per year than the group of NWCs. In the recession 
years 2008 and 2009, the difference in terms of entry events was particularly distinctive 
suggesting that the network carrier’s business is more dependent on the general state of the 
economy than the low-cost carrier’s business.3  
While an analysis of entry events already provides valuable insights on industry dynamics, 
it does not allow a direct conclusion on how successful the respective entries in the sample 
period have been. Due to the unavailability of detailed route-specific profitability data, the 
success of the respective entry events has to be approximated by calculating survival rates. In 
the airline industry, survival rates basically reflect the relationship between the number of 
route entries that are still operated after a certain time period (for which it is assumed that 
unprofitable entry decisions have been reversed) and all route entries in the respective time 
period. Based on this general approach, Figure 2 shows survival rates for the respective 
entries by NWCs and LCCs. An entry into a particular route is counted as ‘survived’ if it was 
still operated by the respective carrier two years after entry.4 
                                                 
3  Although the focus of this article is on the role of market entry, there is no doubt that market exit can be a 
closely related phenomenon. For example, entry into one market can demand exit in another market as, e.g., a 
particular airplane can be operated more efficiently on the new route. Furthermore, any reorganisation of the 
flight network typically triggers waves of entry and exit. For example, airline mergers often lead to market 
exits either through the elimination of overlapping parts of both networks or by the decommissioning of 
entire hubs of one of the merging airlines.  
4  The calculation and interpretation of survival rates offers various degrees of freedom. With respect to 
calculation, Bamberger and Carlton (2006), for example, decided to count an entry as ‘survived’ if the airline 
was still active on the respective route one year after entry. Consequently, they find on average higher 
survival rates than reported in Figure 2 above (based on a ‘two-year’ definition of survival). With respect to 
interpretation, the general results reported in Figure 2 could be specified by analysing survival rates for 
specific carriers or even specific route types of specific carriers (e.g., routes to/from their respective hubs 
versus other routes).   
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Figure 2: Survival rates of market entries by NWCs and LCCs (all markets, entry years 
1996-2007) 
Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, authors’ calculations 
 
As shown in Figure 2, although the survival rates of both groups largely follow the same 
(possibly macroeconomic) trends, the group of NWCs has significantly lower survival rates 
than the group of LCCs. For example, while about 61 percent of all LCC entries in 2001 were 
still operated by the respective airline two years later; the corresponding survival rate for the 
group of NWCs lied at about 23 percent. Over the entire sample period, NWCs show an 
average survival rate of about 43 percent while the LCC value lies at about 68 percent. 
Although these results allow the conclusion that LCC entries are on average more successful 
than NWC entries, it has to be reminded that both groups of airlines follow rather distinct 
business concepts and are at different stages in their life cycles. These differences may 
explain a significant part of the variation in the survival rates.  
3.2 Entry into new non-stop airport-pair markets  
Providing airlines with the freedom to decide on market entry and exit was one of the key 
accomplishments of the liberalisation of the U.S. airline industry. Since then, airlines made 
frequent use of the gained possibilities to optimise their route networks and to provide 
efficient air services to their customers. Complementary to bringing competition to existing 
routes, an important part of an individual airlines’ market success is the identification and 
realisation of additional profit opportunities through the entry into new routes. Although the 
entry decision of the airline is typically profit driven, such ‘innovative entry’ clearly has 
positive impacts on consumers who are able to travel on the newly established airport-pair. In 
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order to investigate the role of innovative entry, Figure 3 shows the percentages of entries by 
network carriers and low-cost carriers into new markets between 1996 and 2009.  
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Figure 3: Percentage of entries by NWCs and LCCs into new markets (1996-2009) 
Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, authors’ calculations 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the percentage of entries into new markets is relatively high and 
constant. In sum, 937 of the 2,342 entry events in the sample period were ‘first mover’ entries 
in airport-pairs that have not been served before in the sample period by any other airline. 457 
of these ‘first mover entries’ where conducted by NWCs while the remaining 480 first mover 
entries were undertaken by members of the group of LCCs. On average, the group of NWCs 
entered 33 new markets per year with 1996 (72 entries) and 2008 (9 entries) delineating the 
value spectrum. For the group of LCCs, 34 new market entries were reported per year on 
average with the highest value of 64 entries in 2007 and the lowest value of 14 entries in 
2003. As it can be expected that the more dense routes are rather mature markets, it is likely 
that the ‘first mover’ routes are relatively small and need time to develop a sufficient level of 
demand. 
3.3 Entry into short-, medium-, and long-haul non-stop airport-pair markets  
In its 1997 report on the ‘Low Cost Airline Service Revolution’, the U.S. DOT expected a 
coexistence of network carriers and low-cost carriers with the latter providing local 
passengers the benefit of additional service and lower prices on short- and medium-haul 
markets, while the former, by continuing to link the spoke city with its network, “[…] provide 
local passengers who prefer to use the network carrier’s service and connecting passengers 
who wish to travel beyond the hub city in other city-pair markets additional, competitive 
alternatives” (U.S. DOT, 1997, p. 17).  
10 
In order to investigate the actual relevance of such a coexistence of NWCs and LCCs, 
Figure 4 provides an overview of the market entries of LCCs in all markets split into short-
haul markets (≤ 750 miles), medium-haul markets (751-1500 miles) and long-haul markets (> 
1500 miles). 
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Figure 4: Number of LCC route entries in short-, medium-, and long-haul markets 
(1996-2009) 
Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, authors’ calculations 
 
As shown in Figure 4, there is significant variation in the entry behaviour across short-, 
medium- and long-haul markets. In sum, between 1996 and 2009, low-cost carriers entered 
1,137 airport-pair markets. 383 entry events (about 34 percent) took place in short-haul 
markets, 548 entry events (about 48 percent) in medium-haul markets and the remaining 206 
entry events (about 18 percent) in long-haul markets. While short-haul entry played the by far 
largest role in 1997 and 1998 with percentage shares above 60 percent, its relative 
significance was reduced substantially since then reaching a low of 14 percent in 2003. 
Medium-haul entry activity is relatively strong across the entire sample period with the lowest 
share in 1997 (26 percent) and the highest share in 2003 (64 percent). This recent switch from 
short-haul to medium-haul entry could be explained by reduced possibilities for profitable 
short-haul entry forcing LCCs to look for business opportunities in the medium-haul segment. 
Finally, with respect to long-haul entry activity, Figure 4 generally shows significant entry 
activity since 1997 with the lowest share of 4 percent in 1998 and the highest share of 32 
percent of all LCC entry events in 2004. Therefore, it can be concluded that although the key 
business focus of LCCs remains on short- and medium-haul markets, even long-haul markets 
can be entered and operated on a permanent basis. This conclusion is supported by casting an 
eye on the respective exit rates. In the sample period, the long-haul segment experienced 59 
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market exits (equal to about 29 percent of all exits), compared to 159 (about 30 percent) in the 
medium-haul segment and 156 (about 41 percent) in the short-haul segment. 
4 Effects of entry into non-stop U.S. airline markets from 1996 to 2009 
Following the characterisation of recent market entry patterns in the domestic U.S. airline 
industry, the logically next step is to investigate the economic effects of entry. In this respect, 
standard oligopoly theory suggests that, first, entry increases competition in the respective 
market and therefore is expected to cause a drop in the average market price and a 
corresponding increase in the supplied quantity (and possibly also production capacities). 
Second, the relative gains of entry for the consumers depend on the structure of the market in 
which entry takes place. In a standard Cournot model, the relative gains in consumer welfare 
are typically highest in case of entry into a monopoly market simply because the benefits of 
competition are brought to the respective market through a substantial reduction in the 
average market price. Third, the gains of entry also depend on the characteristics of the firm 
which enters the respective market. In a standard Cournot model, the introduction of 
asymmetric marginal costs typically leads to asymmetric market shares as the more efficient 
firm produces more (and realises higher profits) than the less efficient firm. Consumers 
benefit through a (further) drop in the equilibrium price compared to the case of a symmetric 
cost structure. 
 Given this brief sketch of mainstream theoretical insights on the effects of entry, the 
remainder of this section aims to provide new evidence on the effects of entry into U.S. airline 
markets. Using the data-set described in the beginning of Section 3 above, we follow two 
separate approaches: a descriptive approach which studies the effects of all entry events by 
LCCs and NWCs in the TOP 500 non-stop U.S. airline markets and an econometric approach 
which investigates the effects of entry into existing non-stop markets for selected low-cost 
carriers and network carriers separately by using logarithmic fixed effects regressions. 
Although rather distinctive in their execution, both approaches study the effects of entry by 
differentiating between the following four parameters:   
 Market yield (in 1995 cents per mile) as a measure for the price effects of entry; 
 Number of passengers as a measure for the demand effects of entry. 
 Number of departures as a measure for the supply and quality effects of entry5; 
 Number of seats as a measure for the supply effects of entry; 
                                                 
5  The number of departures can also be interpreted as a measure of quality as – with a growing number of 
departures – the traveller has more choices between different travel times over the day and is therefore able to 
reach a better fit of the transportation needs with the general work (or leisure) schedule. 
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As argued above, oligopoly theory would suggest that the average market yield is reduced 
by entry while the different measures for supply and demand are expected to increase 
following entry.  
Given these four key market parameters, both approaches differentiate further between the 
following three market structures in which entry takes place: 
 Monopoly routes, i.e. entry leads to a second carrier in a market;  
 Oligopoly routes without LCC, i.e. entry leads to a further carrier in a NWC market; 
 Oligopoly with LCC, i.e. entry leads to a further carrier in a NWC/LCC market. 
As already sketched above, this separation is motivated by key insights from oligopoly 
theory which suggest that the effects of entry depend on the type of market in which entry 
takes place. For example, ceteris paribus, entry into monopoly markets is expected to lead to 
the largest percentage drop in market price. Furthermore, entry by a LCC into oligopoly 
markets without any other LCC can be expected to lead to more pronounced price effects than 
entry into oligopoly markets in which another LCC is already operating.6 Such a hypothesis 
can on the one hand be based on the theory of multimarket contact which suggests that 
particularly NWCs have incentives to reduce competition intensity given their competitive 
interaction in many markets. LCCs can be expected to challenge such states of ‘mutual 
forbearance’ among NWCs thereby causing price decreases. On the other hand, the presence 
of another LCC in the respective market typically suggests that competition intensity is 
already elevated (and a significant fraction of LCC demand is already served). As a 
consequence, the entry of a second LCC is expected to cause smaller effects on market price. 
4.1 Descriptive approach 
In the descriptive approach, we identify all entry events in the TOP 5007 non-stop U.S. airline 
markets between 1996 and 2009. In contrast to prior research, we split the 434 entry events 
with respect to the characteristics of the entering firm, i.e. either entry by a LCC or a NWC. 
Subsequently, we derive and study the average effects of the 197 LCC route entries and 237 
NWC route entries with respect to the above mentioned four key market parameters and the 
three market structures for the twelve quarters before and after the respective (eventually 
                                                 
6  It is important to remind at this point that our analysis concentrates on the effects of entry in existing markets 
only. Any study that aims at calculating the entire (consumer) welfare effect of entry, however, has to include 
the (consumer) welfare created by entry into new markets (i.e., markets which did not have a direct 
connection prior to the entry of a specific carrier).   
7  In the sample period, on average, 64 percent of all U.S. domestic passengers travelled in the TOP 500 
markets. 
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successful or unsuccessful) entry events. Given this basic set-up, Figure 5 plots the results of 
the analysis for the group of LCCs. 8    
 Starting with the top left chart in Figure 5, the respective market yield graphs for the three 
market structures confirm one basic result of the standard Cournot model: market yields in 
monopoly markets are on average higher than market yields in oligopoly markets. A further 
reduction in average yield is realised in markets in which a LCC is already operating on the 
respective route. Turning from this general observation to the effects of entry, the chart 
clearly shows that LCC entry on average leads to a significant decrease in market yield. As 
expected from oligopoly theory, the largest effects can be observed for LCC entries into 
monopoly routes. After a LCC has entered a former monopoly route, the average market yield 
drops by about 5 cents per mile (about 17 percent) in the quarter of the entry event and further 
2 cents per mile in the quarter following entry leading to an average drop in yield of about 25 
percent. This effect is less pronounced for oligopoly markets. Irrespective of the presence of a 
LCC in the market before entry, the average market yield drops by about 1 cent per mile in 
the quarter of entry and 1 additional cent per mile in the quarter following entry. In the 
quarters following t+1, the market yield largely remains stable, i.e. the decrease in average 
yield appears to be permanent; only the case of entry into monopoly markets shows on 
average a significant increase in market yield in the twelve quarters following entry. 
However, the price level in t+12 is still about 5 cent (about 17 percent) lower than before the 
entry event suggesting that entry on average had a permanent impact on yield in the 
respective routes.  
                                                 
8  The numerical values of the short-term effects of entry for the group of LCCs are summarized in Table 3 in 
the Appendix. 
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Figure 5: Average yield, passengers, departures and seats in the TOP 500 markets three years before and after LCC entry events 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ calculations
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Turning from yield to demand-related factors, the analysis of the effects of entry on the 
number of passengers – shown in the top right chart – reveals that the demand level on 
monopoly routes is significantly lower than in oligopoly markets. With respect to the effects 
of entry, in the quarter in which LCC entry occurs, the number of passengers increased on 
average by about 33,600 passengers (about 27 percent) in former monopoly routes and 
additional 23,140 passengers (in sum about 45 percent) in the quarter following entry. The 
total increase of the average number of passengers from the quarter before entry to the quarter 
after entry is about 52,300 passengers (about 25 percent) in oligopoly markets in which no 
LCC was active before and about 46,700 passengers (about 20 percent) in oligopoly markets 
in which at least one other LCC was already operating. In the quarters following t+1, the 
number of passengers largely remains stable and only shows moderate seasonal effects. 
 Turning from the demand to the supply-related factors, the analysis of the number of 
departures in the bottom left chart reveals that after a LCC has entered one of the TOP 500 
routes, the average frequency of flights offered increased substantially in all types of markets. 
In the quarter in which LCC entry occurs, the frequency of departures increased on average 
by about 325 quarterly departures (about 28 percent) in former monopoly routes and 
additional 207 quarterly departures (in sum about 45 percent) in the quarter following entry. 
The total increase of average frequency from the quarter before entry to the quarter after entry 
is about 438 quarterly departures (about 22 percent) in oligopoly markets in which no LCC 
was active before and about 412 quarterly departures (about 17 percent) in oligopoly markets 
in which at least one other LCC was already operating. In the quarters following t+1, the 
number of departures largely remains stable and only shows moderate seasonal effects.  
The analysis of the effects of entry on the average number of available seats shows 
comparable results. In the quarter in which LCC entry occurs, the number of seats increased 
on average by about 40,400 seats (about 23 percent) in former monopoly routes and 
additional 30,550 seats (in sum about 41 percent) in the quarter following entry. The total 
increase of the average number of seats from the quarter before entry to the quarter after entry 
is about 59,570 seats (about 21 percent) in oligopoly markets in which no LCC was active 
before and about 62,350 seats (about 20 percent) in oligopoly markets in which at least one 
other LCC was already operating. In the quarters following t+1, the number of seats largely 
remains stable and only shows moderate seasonal effects.  
16 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Average yield, passengers, departures and seats in the TOP 500 markets three years before and after NWC entry events 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ calculations
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Given the analysis of the effects of entry by LCCs, the consequential next step is to 
investigate the corresponding effects of entry by NWCs. Figure 6 shows the results of the 
corresponding analysis for this group of airlines. 9  
 As revealed in Figure 6, entries by NWCs have less pronounced effects on average market 
yields than LCC entries. For the cases of entry into oligopoly markets, no considerable effects 
on market yields can be observed. In case of former monopoly markets, the overall drop in 
average market yield amounts to about 2 cents per mile (about 5 percent). However, 
extending the post-entry observation period to t+12 reveals that even these small market yield 
decreases must be considered temporary as the average market yield reaches pre-entry levels 
three years after entry. Given this key observation, it can be concluded that the characteristics 
of the airline that enters a particular market is a crucial determinant of the price effects of 
entry. While LCC entry leads to a large and permanent reduction of market yield on the 
respective route, NWC entry rather causes small and only temporary decreases in market 
yield.  
Turning from the market yields to the post-entry supply and demand measures, we see that 
the observable effects are more pronounced and largely comparable to the LCC observations 
with respect to both direction and dimension. For example, comparing the quarter before entry 
with the quarter after entry reveals that the average number of departures – shown in the 
bottom left chart in Figure 6 – increased by about 380 quarterly departures (about 31 percent) 
in former monopolies, by about 277 departures per quarter (about 12 percent) in oligopolies 
without any LCC and by about 123 departures per quarter (about 6 percent) in oligopoly 
markets in which at least one other LCC is operating. In the quarters following t+1, the number 
of departures largely remained stable for the monopoly routes and the oligopoly routes 
without a LCC. The graph for oligopoly routes with a LCC, however, shows that the average 
number of departures decreased in the first three years after entry reaching a level even below 
the pre-entry value. One explanation for this observation could be that competition in these 
types of markets is particularly tough and likely leads to market exit of at least one carrier in 
the years after the entry of the second LCC. The comparable characteristics of the graphs for 
the number of seats and number of passengers support such an explanation.   
In a nutshell, the analysis of the price and quantity effects of entry by LCCs and NWCs in 
the TOP 500 non-stop U.S. airport-pair markets between 1996 and 2009 reveals that 
substantial increases in consumer welfare can only be expected when a LCC decides to enter a 
certain (concentrated) non-stop airport-pair. These empirical findings largely confirm the 
                                                 
9  The numerical values of the short-term effects of entry for the group of NWCs are summarized in Table 3 in 
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results of the standard Cournot models which suggest that low-cost entry leads to larger price 
decreases than entry of an equally efficient firm. 
4.2 Econometric approach 
Although the descriptive analysis in the preceding section already provided useful insights, 
our data set also allows the application of more sophisticated econometric tools to investigate 
especially the long-term effects of entry. In particular, given the significant heterogeneity 
within both groups of carriers, we complement the general descriptive analysis by 
investigating the effects of entry into existing non-stop markets for the four largest LCCs 
(Southwest (WN), JetBlue (B6), AirTran (FL) and Spirit Airlines (NK)) and the four largest 
NWCs (Delta (DL), American Airlines (AA), United (UA) and US Airways (US)) separately 
by using logarithmic fixed effects regressions. For each carrier we used the panel data set 
from 1996 to 2009 described in Section 3 above to estimate a model of the following 
structure: 
itiitiitiititit uaControlsOliLCCServeOliNWCServeServey ++⋅+×⋅+×⋅+⋅+= γββββ 3210)ln(
 
This model explains the effect of a carrier serving (Serve) market i10 in time (quarter) t 
directly on four dependent variables y, i.e. market yield, number of passengers, number of 
departures and number of available seats. The dummy variable ‘Serve’ becomes one in the 
quarter of entry and keeps the value as long as the carrier serves the market. If the carrier exits 
the respective market the dummy becomes zero again. Thus, the effect estimated through the 
regression analyses is not restricted to a 12-quarter period but captures the full (long-term) 
effect of entry on our dependent variables. We allow the effect to differ with respect to the 
market structure directly before the respective airline has entered the market. Therefore, we 
interact the variable Serve with, first, a dummy variable which indicates if the carrier has 
entered into a former oligopoly market consisting of only NWC (OliNWC) and, second, with 
a dummy variable which indicates if the carrier has entered into a former oligopoly market 
with at least one LCC (OliLCC). Entry into former monopoly markets serves as reference. 
Due to the fact that the coefficients in our model can be interpreted as semi-elasticities, 
1β captures the relative (long-term) effect if a carrier now serves a former monopoly market. 
The effects of entry into former oligopolies without LCC presence and the effects of entry 
into former oligopolies with LCC presence can be calculated as 21 ββ +  and 31 ββ + , 
respectively. The variable ia  captures all unobserved, time-constant market characteristics 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Appendix. 
10  For each carrier, we investigate those markets i in which the carrier actually entered between 1996 and 2009. 
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that influence our dependent variable yit. Fixed effects panel regressions allow us to control 
for time-constant market characteristics such as non-stop distance as well as connections 
involving secondary airports or highly congested hubs without explicitly measuring the effect 
of those characteristics. The idiosyncratic error term is denoted by itu . We control for time-
varying market characteristics (Controlsit) through the inclusion of the total number of 
carriers serving the market (except for the entering carrier), the number of (other) LCCs 
serving the market, the average plane size, the average unemployment rate and the number of 
inhabitants in the respective metropolitan statistical area. A more detailed variable description 
and summary statistics are provided in Table 4 in the Appendix.  
We present the effects of entry for each of the LCCs in Table 1 while the effects of entry 
for each of the NWCs can be retrieved from Table 2.11 As shown in the tables, entry into 
monopoly markets by all low-cost carriers in our sub-sample led to statistically as well as 
economically significant drops in the average price between 10.9 percent and 18.1 percent. 
Entry into monopoly markets by network carriers, however, only led to significant drops in 
the average price for two carriers: Delta (3.8 percent) and US (6.2 percent). While the weakly 
significant entry effect for Delta might have to do with its substantially higher entry activity in 
combination with two (failed) attempts to introduce an own low-cost brand12, the observable 
effect for US Airways can most likely be attributed to its 2005 merger with the low-cost 
carrier America West Airlines leaving the merged entity as a hybrid carrier between NWC 
and LCC. 
All in all, the conclusions of the descriptive analysis for the effects of entry into monopoly 
markets in the preceding section are largely confirmed: While LCC entry consistently leads to 
a significant drop in the average market yield, NWC entry does not show comparably 
consistent effects. Comparing both sets of results, however, reveals that the size of the price 
reductions following LCC entry is substantially smaller in the econometric framework 
compared to the descriptive framework. One explanation for this finding might be that the 
                                                 
11  The complete regressions are provided in Tables 5 to 12 in the Appendix on an airline-by-airline basis. 
12  The post-deregulation era has seen several attempts by network carriers to launch their own low-cost carriers. 
For example, Delta founded Delta Express in 1996. The airline operated a hub at Orlando airport and focused 
particularly on leisure routes. In order to be able to compete on price, Delta Express’ fleet consisted of only 
one aircraft type with an all coach class configuration. No in-flight entertainment or meal service was 
offered. Delta Express ceased operations in 2003 and was replaced by Song as the new low-fare brand of 
Delta. Song, however, ceased operations in 2006 and was reintegrated into its parent company. Comparably 
unsuccessful launches of low-fare brands were experienced by United (Ted, 2004-2009) and US Airways 
(MetroJet, 1998-2001). From an analytical perspective, T-100 data does not provide an easy solution to 
separate between entries of the respective network carrier and entries by its respective low-cost branch as the 
respective airline codes for both carriers are identical. However, the length and breadth of our data set 
together with the rather short, rather small and rather unsuccessful low-cost endeavours of the network 
carriers make it unlikely that they affect our results to a larger degree. 
20 
latter analysis measures the long-term effects while the descriptive analysis concentrated on 
the short- and medium-term effects. As shown in Figure 5, the price reaction following LCC 
entry overshoots in the first quarter as prices increase slightly in the following quarters partly 
diminishing the long-term effect obtained from the descriptive analysis. Furthermore, it is 
important to remind that the descriptive analysis – due to the pooling of all LCC and NWC 
entries – focused on entries into the TOP 500 markets only, while the econometric analysis is 
able to include all entry events of the respective carriers in the sample period. Our analysis 
therefore also suggests that competition in the TOP 500 markets is tougher – in the sense that 
the effects of entry are more pronounced – than in cases of entry into smaller markets. 
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Table 1: Effects of entry by LCCs - Results from logarithmic fixed effects regressions 
Market yield             
Market structure quarter before entry WN  (s.e.) B6  (s.e.) FL  (s.e.) NK  (s.e.) 
Monopoly -0.109 *** (0.040) -0.114 *** (0.020) -0.181 *** (0.031) -0.117 *** (0.035) 
Oligopoly w/o LCC 0.007  (0.036) -0.058  (0.035) -0.180 *** (0.047) -0.088 ** (0.039) 
Oligopoly with LCC(s) -0.104  (0.068) 0.049  (0.041) -0.024  (0.021) -0.018  (0.022) 
Number of entries 163   79   159   44   
             
Passengers             
Market structure quarter before entry WN  (s.e.) B6  (s.e.) FL  (s.e.) NK  (s.e.) 
Monopoly 0.222 ** (0.095) 0.400 *** (0.094) 0.512 *** (0.073) 0.441 *** (0.103) 
Oligopoly w/o LCC 0.337 *** (0.076) 0.188 *** (0.041) 0.369 *** (0.066) 0.296 *** (0.084) 
Oligopoly with LCC(s) 0.104 ** (0.045) -0.017  (0.055) 0.377 *** (0.065) -0.084 * (0.047) 
Number of entries 163   79   159   44   
             
Departures             
Market structure quarter before entry WN  (s.e.) B6  (s.e.) FL  (s.e.) NK  (s.e.) 
Monopoly 0.255 ** (0.110) 0.362 *** (0.061) 0.447 *** (0.072) 0.438 *** (0.098) 
Oligopoly w/o LCC 0.332 *** (0.073) 0.159 *** (0.049) 0.310 *** (0.064) 0.303 *** (0.078) 
Oligopoly with LCC(s) 0.087 ** (0.038) 0.091  (0.106) 0.385 *** (0.075) -0.024  (0.045) 
Number of entries 163   79   159   44   
 
Seats 
            
Market structure quarter before entry WN  (s.e.) B6  (s.e.) FL  (s.e.) NK  (s.e.) 
Monopoly 0.278 ** (0.113) 0.425 *** (0.094) 0.502 *** (0.071) 0.450 *** (0.097) 
Oligopoly w/o LCC 0.334 *** (0.075) 0.207 *** (0.044) 0.348 *** (0.066) 0.326 *** (0.083) 
Oligopoly with LCC(s) 0.101 ** (0.041) 0.090  (0.102) 0.378 *** (0.073) -0.042  (0.046) 
Number of entries 163   79   159   44   
   Notes: Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for H0: Effect = 0, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
   Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2: Effects of entry by NWCs - Results from logarithmic fixed effects regressions 
Market yield             
Market structure quarter before entry AA   (s.e.) DL   (s.e.) UA   (s.e.) US   (s.e.) 
Monopoly -0.030  (0.026) -0.038 * (0.021) 0.028  (0.065) -0.062 * (0.034) 
Oligopoly w/o LCC 0.011  (0.035) 0.005  (0.046) 0.000  (0.059) -0.064 *** (0.023) 
Oligopoly with LCC(s) -0.063 *** (0.021) -0.101 *** (0.030) 0.039  (0.032) -0.041  (0.041) 
Number of entries 123   100   37   105   
             
Passengers             
Market structure quarter before entry AA   (s.e.) DL   (s.e.) UA   (s.e.) US   (s.e.) 
Monopoly 0.262 *** (0.093) 0.254 *** (0.089) 0.236 *** (0.065) 0.274 * (0.151) 
Oligopoly w/o LCC 0.105  (0.066) 0.212 * (0.127) 0.464 *** (0.112) 0.246 *** (0.090) 
Oligopoly with LCC(s) 0.452 *** (0.079) 0.364 ** (0.181) 0.262 *** (0.096) 0.144 *** (0.047) 
Number of entries 123   100   37   105   
             
Departures             
Market structure quarter before entry AA   (s.e.) DL   (s.e.) UA   (s.e.) US   (s.e.) 
Monopoly 0.303 *** (0.092) 0.270 *** (0.076) 0.307 *** (0.072) 0.328 ** (0.147) 
Oligopoly w/o LCC 0.126 * (0.071) 0.313 *** (0.107) 0.483 *** (0.139) 0.249 ** (0.104) 
Oligopoly with LCC(s) 0.486 *** (0.083) 0.361 * (0.191) 0.279 *** (0.095) 0.162 *** (0.051) 
Number of entries 123   100   37   105   
 
Seats 
            
Market structure quarter before entry AA   (s.e.) DL   (s.e.) UA   (s.e.) US   (s.e.) 
Monopoly 0.304 *** (0.088) 0.307 *** (0.082) 0.320 *** (0.075) 0.342 ** (0.144) 
Oligopoly w/o LCC 0.128 * (0.073) 0.301 ** (0.118) 0.497 *** (0.138) 0.281 *** (0.096) 
Oligopoly with LCC(s) 0.489 *** (0.081) 0.394 ** (0.197) 0.279 *** (0.094) 0.168 *** (0.052) 
Number of entries 123   100   37   105   
   Notes: Significance levels *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 for H0: Effect = 0, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
   Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ calculations. 
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Turning from the discussion of the results for entry into monopoly markets to the respective 
results for oligopoly markets, Table 1 reveals that entry into oligopoly markets without LCC 
presence led to significant price drops for the entries of AirTran (18.0 percent) and Spirit 
Airlines (8.8 percent) only. Interestingly, while entries of Spirit into oligopolies of NWCs 
resulted in a significantly lower price drop than the airline’s entries into monopolies, the 
change in yields for AirTran’s entries into monopoly markets does not differ from its entries 
into oligopolies without LCC presence suggesting different entry strategies of the two 
carriers. As further revealed by Table 1, entry by both Southwest and JetBlue do not show 
significant effects on market yield (although the respective coefficient for JetBlue is close to 
significance with a p-value of 0.102). Both results are likely driven by the small number of 
observations in this category since a large percentage of the entries of both airlines took place 
in either former monopoly markets (studied above) or created new markets (which are outside 
the scope of this article).13 An alternative explanation could be built on the results of the study 
by Goolsbee and Syverson (2008). Given their key finding that incumbents cut fares 
significantly when only threatened by Southwest’s entry (i.e., before actual entry takes place), 
the insignificant price effects at the time of entry might have to do with the fact that prices 
already experienced a significant drop at the time when the likelihood of entry by Southwest 
(or JetBlue) increased above a certain threshold level.14 Such an interpretation of our results 
would then suggest that Southwest and JetBlue are the two low-cost carriers, incumbent’s fear 
most and therefore reduce prices significantly even before the actual entry event.      
Interestingly, the estimations for the group of LCCs reveal further that AirTran is the ‘most 
effective’ carrier in terms of (immediate) price reductions following entry. Taking together 
the number of entries with the average effects of entry, our analysis suggests that the times 
where low-cost carrier competition was set equal to competition by Southwest are over. While 
Southwest entered 163 markets in the sample period, the other three larger LCCs managed to 
enter 282 markets (AirTran having the largest share with 159 entries) with at least similar 
average price drops after entry. However, the recently announced and already approved 
merger between Southwest and AirTran will very likely help Southwest to defend and extend 
its position as the largest and most successful LCC in the domestic U.S. airline industry. 
                                                 
13  For example, between 2000 and 2009, JetBlue entered 131 domestic markets. On average, 40 percent of all 
entries created new routes, with 14 percent in 2005 and 83 percent in 2002 delineating the spectrum. 
However, despite the significance of entry into new markets, in 2009, only 30 percent of the 20 million 
JetBlue passengers traveled in new markets while the remaining 70 percent flew in existing markets.  
14  An example for such an increase in the likelihood of entry could be the announcement of Southwest or 
JetBlue to include a new airport into their route network. Given the (partly sunk) investments in new airport 
presence together with the possibilities to exploit network economies makes it very likely that the respective 
carrier will extent its number of connections from the respective airport.  
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Turning from the LCCs to the NWCs, the estimations show a significant price drop of 6.4 
percent only for US Airways while all the other entries of NWCs into oligopoly markets of 
NWCs show very small and insignificant coefficients. Generally, this result suggests that 
NWCs compete in quality dimensions – most prominently the sizes of their (inter)national 
networks – rather than price. Given their elevated cost structure, the possibilities (and 
incentives) to compete over price are small in the absence of a LCC. With respect to US 
Airways, the significant coefficient is again likely related to the merger between US Airways 
and America West leaving the merged entity as a hybrid carrier between NWC and LCC. 
Furthermore, within our econometric framework, we do not find any statistically 
significant price effect of LCC entry into oligopolies in which another LCC is already 
present. Although this observation might again be driven by the relatively rare occurrence of 
such events, an alternative explanation can be based on the already elevated level of 
competition in these markets and the therefore limited possibilities for further price reductions 
after entry of an additional LCC. However, interestingly, for the group of NWCs, our 
estimations show significant and relatively large yield reductions following entries of 
American (6.3 percent) and Delta (10.1 percent). In line with the results of Lin et al. (2002), 
one explanation for this observation could be tough competition (or even price wars) between 
LCCs and especially the NWCs’ low-fare brands on a number of dense and often prestigious 
routes.15 The corresponding substantial capacity increases for American (+ 48.9 percent) and 
Delta (+ 39.4 percent) entries (in terms of available seats) support this hypothesis. 
Additionally, these routes might also have an important role in transporting international 
(connecting) passengers, possibly allowing NWCs to cross-subsidise the domestic flight 
segment with the international flight segment. Generally, the combination of insignificant 
results for entries into oligopoly markets of NWCs only and significant results for the same 
category but with LCC presence suggests that NWCs who decide to enter these markets are 
fully aware that they will only be able to compete by offering lower fares than they would 
offer on routes on which they only have to compete against other NWCs. In essence, this 
result suggests that the entry strategies of NWCs change substantially with the types of 
players active in the market pre-entry. This general result is again supported by the 
coefficients for US Airways which is the only NWC that shows insignificant results in the 
oligopoly entry with LCC category, and a large and significant coefficient in the oligopoly 
entry with NWC only category.  
                                                 
15  One example of such fierce competitive interaction was JetBlue and Song (the former low-fare brand of 
Delta) on flights to Florida (which both carriers picked as key region in their respective entry strategies). 
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Complementary to the price effects of entry, Table 1 and Table 2 also report the 
corresponding quantity effects of entry split into passengers, departures and available seats. 
Starting with the group of low-cost carriers, the results show that the long-term demand 
increases following entry diverge substantially between the carriers. While Southwest entry 
into monopoly markets on average led to a demand increase of 22.2 percent, the other three 
LCCs realized substantially higher values of up to 51.2 percent in the case of AirTran. This 
might have to do with both different stages in the development of the companies and different 
business (and entry) strategies. Furthermore, while an entry of AirTran increased the number 
of available seats by 50.2 percent and the number of departures by 44.7 percent on average, 
available capacity and frequency increased on average only by 27.8 percent and 25.5 percent, 
respectively, following an entry of Southwest. 
The picture changes when entry effects into oligopoly markets (only NWC) are 
investigated. In this category, Southwest reaches a substantially higher demand increase of on 
average 33.7 percent, only overtopped by AirTran with 36.9 percent. Interestingly, capacity 
and frequency increases have been on a similar level following the entry events of both 
airlines. With the exception of Southwest, the results of the descriptive analysis are confirmed 
in the sense that entry into oligopoly markets lead to lower percentage increases in demand 
than entries into monopoly markets.  
Turning from the group of LCCs to the group of NWC, the coefficients for the entry effects 
into monopoly markets reveal comparable demand increases of about 25 percent for all 
carriers although capacity increases were significantly higher (30 to 34 percent). In this 
respect, the results of the descriptive analysis are confirmed which showed that the demand 
increases following entry are substantially higher for the group of low-cost carriers (triggered 
by their lower prices). 
The effects of NWC oligopoly entry are rather mixed. While American and Delta entries 
into oligopoly markets with an LCC show very substantial demand increases of 45.2 percent 
and 36.4 percent (suggesting the above mentioned fierce competition in this market category), 
the coefficient for American and entries into oligopolies with only NWC turns out to be much 
smaller and partly insignificant. For the remaining two NWC, United and US Airways, the 
coefficient show inverted characteristics in the sense that the demand effects of entry into 
NWC oligopoly markets are higher than the effects of entry into oligopoly markets in which 
another LCC is already present. Although these results have to be interpreted cautiously as the 
majority of NWC entries (about 70 percent) took place in monopoly markets, they do suggest 
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a substantial heterogeneity in the business (and entry) strategies of the four NWCs under 
investigation.  
In a nutshell, we can conclude that the demand effects of entry largely confirm the 
theoretical reasoning and the results of the descriptive analysis. However, the analysis reveals 
that neither the group of LCCs nor the group of NWCs are homogeneous in the sense that 
entries by the respective carriers always lead to comparable economic effects. Quite the 
contrary, these companies partly have quite different historic backgrounds and follow quite 
different business (and entry) strategies and therefore cause quite distinctive economic effects 
of entry. For the group of LCCs, one key impression from the price effects analysis can be 
confirmed, namely that Southwest cannot be considered as the only significant LCC anymore. 
In fact, the effects of entry by other LCCs are more significant than the (immediate) effects 
found for Southwest. 
5 Conclusion 
Providing airlines with the freedom to decide on market entry and exit was one of the key 
accomplishments of the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry in 1978. Since then, airlines 
made frequent use of the gained possibilities to optimise their route networks and to provide 
efficient air services to their customers. Although entry in deregulated U.S. airline markets 
has been the focus of prior research, significant recent market developments such as severe 
external and internal shocks or the continuing growth of low-cost carriers demand a revisit of 
this important topic. Against this background, we use T-100 traffic data and DB1B fare data 
from the U.S. Department of Transportation to identify patterns and effects of entry by 
network carriers and low-cost carriers in non-stop U.S. airline markets. 
Summarising the key insights of the article, the section on patterns of entry into non-stop 
U.S. airline markets from 1996 to 2009 generally identified significant entry activity for both 
network carriers and low-cost carriers over the last fifteen years. However, while the network 
carriers showed substantial entry activity between 1996 and 2000, the average number of 
entries dropped significantly from 2003 onwards. Since 2004, the group of low-cost carriers 
entered more markets per year than the group of network carriers. In addition, the analysis 
revealed that low-cost carrier entries have significantly higher survival rates than entries by 
network carriers. Finally, it was found that low-cost carriers recently started to enter long-haul 
markets with a travel distance of more than 1,500 miles. This finding suggests that 
competitive pressure on network carriers will increase even further in the years to come.  
Turning from the patterns of entry to the effects of entry, new evidence on the effects of 
non-stop route entry between 1996 and 2009 was derived by applying two different 
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approaches: a descriptive approach which studied the effects of all network carrier and low-
cost carrier entries in the TOP 500 non-stop U.S. airline markets and an econometric approach 
which investigated the effects of entry into existing non-stop markets for selected low-cost 
carriers and network carriers separately by using logarithmic fixed effects regressions. The 
descriptive approach revealed that only entry by low-cost carriers on average led to significant 
decreases in market yield. The largest effect – a (permanent) reduction of market yield by 
about 5 cents per mile (about 17 percent) in the quarter of the entry event and further 
(temporary) 2 cents per mile in the quarter following entry (in sum about 25 percent) – was 
observed for entries of low-cost carriers in monopoly routes, followed by entry into oligopoly 
markets. By contrast, entry events of network carriers generally had less pronounced effects 
on average market yields. For the cases of entry into oligopoly markets, no considerable 
effects on market yields were observed. In case of former monopoly markets, the (temporary) 
overall reduction in average market yield amounts to about 2 cents per mile (about 5 percent).  
The results of the econometric approach by and large confirmed the general findings of the 
descriptive analysis although the sizes of the effects partly showed significant differences. 
Interestingly, the econometric approach further revealed that the economic effects of entry 
differed not only between the three different pre-entry market structures and the two groups of 
carriers but also showed a substantial within-group variation likely driven by different 
business (and entry) strategies of the respective network or low-cost carriers. In particular, our 
analysis suggested that, first, Southwest cannot be considered as the only significant low-cost 
carrier anymore since several other members of this group showed equal or even more 
significant effects of entry. Although it seems likely that part of this result is driven by 
Southwest’s (and JetBlue’s) outstanding reputation – leading the respective incumbent 
carriers to substantial price reductions as soon as it becomes sufficiently likely that one of 
those carriers will eventually enter the respective route (i.e., before the actual entry event) – 
entries by other low-cost carriers are found to cause substantial drops in the average market 
yield in the quarter of entry. Second, due to its merger with the low-cost carrier America West 
in 2005, US Airways must be considered as a hybrid carrier positioned between network 
carriers and low-cost carriers. This hypothesis is basically supported by the econometric 
approach which identified that the effects of entry of US Airways are comparable to those of a 
low-cost carrier rather than a network carrier. Last but not least, the highly significant yield 
reductions after entries by American Airlines and Delta Air Lines into oligopoly markets in 
which a low-cost carrier was already present suggested that both carriers follow a rather 
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aggressive strategy to fight their low-cost rivals in those markets (and/or are aggressively 
fought by the respective incumbent carriers in the market).   
Given this recapitulation of the key results of the article, it can be concluded that the 
appearance and growth of low-cost carriers is one of the most important developments in the 
deregulated U.S. airline industry. Given the substantial effects of low-cost carrier entry on 
market price and therefore consumer welfare, the responsible competition authorities – not 
only in the United States but in all countries with a significant presence of low-cost carriers –
are well advised to closely monitor the industry and to intervene in cases of welfare-reducing 
strategic behaviour of incumbents that only aim at deterring market entry of potential 
competitors. Such a pro-active competition policy is an important cornerstone in an overall 
strategy to keep the airline industry competitive and to continue harvesting the sweet fruits of 
deregulation.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 3: Average value and percentage changes for yield, passengers, departures, and 
seats from the quarter before entry (t-1) to the quarter after entry (t+1) 
  Monopoly routes Oligopoly w/o LCC Oligopoly with LCC 
  
Average 
value 
%-change 
(t-1 basis) 
Average 
value 
%-change 
(t-1 basis) 
Average 
value 
%-change 
(t-1 basis) 
Average Yield – LCC entry             
Quarter before entry 30.08   23.62   19.54  
Quarter of entry 25.01 -16.86 22.08 -6.54 18.57 -4.94 
Quarter after entry 22.61 -24.85 20.72 -12.29 17.33 -11.29 
Average Yield – NWC entry             
Quarter before entry 28.63   26.47   18.56  
Quarter of entry 27.16 -5.11 25.66 -3.05 18.77 1.12 
Quarter after entry 26.79 -6.44 25.55 -3.47 18.97 2.20 
Average Passengers – LCC entry             
Quarter before entry 124,755   207,339   235,375  
Quarter of entry 158,352 26.93 238,494 15.03 268,633 14.13 
Quarter after entry 181,491 45.48 259,644 25.23 282,074 19.84 
Average Passengers – NWC entry             
Quarter before entry 131,637   201,104   207,397  
Quarter of entry 148,727 12.98 211,355 5.10 212,669 2.54 
Quarter after entry 161,969 23.04 233,054 15.89 216,629 4.45 
Average Departures – LCC entry             
Quarter before entry 1171   2017   2353  
Quarter of entry 1496 27.80 2241 11.09 2596 10.34 
Quarter after entry 1703 45.47 2455 21.71 2765 17.49 
Average Departures – NWC entry             
Quarter before entry 1236   2220   2155  
Quarter of entry 1438 16.32 2352 5.96 2233 3.60 
Quarter after entry 1616 30.71 2497 12.47 2278 5.73 
Average Seats – LCC entry             
Quarter before entry 172,932   287,576   313,070  
Quarter of entry 213,329 23.36 316,101 9.92 351,756 12.36 
Quarter after entry 243,881 41.03 347,145 20.71 375,421 19.92 
Average Seats – NWC entry             
Quarter before entry 184,896   300,490   288,916  
Quarter of entry 212,509 14.93 318,165 5.88 299,875 3.79 
Quarter after entry 235,673 27.46 340,035 13.16 305,494 5.74 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ 
calculations. 
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Table 4: Description and summary statistics of all variables used in fixed effects regressions 
 Description Mean for regressions of carrier X’s effect of entry 
  WN (Southwest) 
B6 
(JetBlue) 
FL 
(Air Tran) 
NK 
(Spirit) 
 AA 
(American) 
DL 
(Delta) 
UA 
(United) 
US 
(US) 
Dependent variables 
ln(yield)  Logarithm of market fare per mile in 1995 real terms (U.S. cents) 2.565 2.537 3.007 2.791  2.963 2.962 3.009 2.971 
ln(pass.)  Logarithm of market size as measured by the quarterly number of all airlines’ non-stop passengers 11.334 11.558 11.701 11.530  11.061 10.558 11.212 11.286 
ln(dep.) Logarithm of the number of quarterly departures (all airlines) 6.744 6.899 7.197 6.903  6.759 6.425 6.827 6.868 
ln(seats) Logarithm of the number of available quarterly seats (all airlines) 11.624 11.799 12.011 11.807  11.426 10.919 11.548 11.622 
Independent variables 
X Serve Carrier X serves the market non-stop in quarter t (dummy variable) 0.891 0.946 0.737 0.460  0.681 0.613 0.556 0.657 
Market structure before entry          
Monopoly Before X entered the market, the market was a monopoly (reference category). 0.648 0.586 0.472 0.503  0.537 0.658 0.597 0.523 
OliNWC Before X entered the market, the market was a duopoly of network carriers (dummy variable). 0.207 0.346 0.426 0.426  0.216 0.165 0.250 0.181 
OliLCC Before X entered the market, the market was a duopoly with at least one low-cost carrier (dummy variable). 0.145 0.068 0.102 0.071  0.247 0.176 0.153 0.296 
# LCC w/o X Number of (other) LCCs serving the market 0.188 0.185 0.205 0.281  0.441 0.433 0.311 0.450 
# Carrier w/o X Total number of carriers serving the market (except of the carrier X). 1.090 1.305 1.342 1.782  1.173 1.186 1.320 1.255 
Avg. plane size Average plane size (average number of available seats per flight) 134.160 139.281 128.490 140.002  117.319 103.066 128.104 123.117 
Unempl. rate 
(mean) 
Average unemployment rate (MSA, arithmetic mean of endpoints, 
in percent) 5.362 5.772 5.397 5.901  5.576 5.273 5.476 5.536 
Population 
(mean) 
Number of inhabitants (MSA, arithmetic mean of endpoints, in 
100,000 persons) 36.316 79.600 39.958 70.682  51.567 55.498 66.198 45.525 
Quarter           
Q1 First quarter dummy variable (reference category) 0.236 0.226 0.234 0.239  0.244 0.237 0.235 0.226 
Q2 Second quarter dummy variable 0.248 0.246 0.252 0.247  0.248 0.247 0.245 0.236 
Q3 Third quarter dummy variable 0.254 0.256 0.251 0.248  0.252 0.253 0.259 0.262 
Q4 Fourth quarter dummy variable 0.261 0.272 0.263 0.265  0.257 0.263 0.260 0.276 
Year Trend variable (year) 2004.6 2006.6 2005.0 2004.8  2004.9 2004.5 2004.3 2005.8 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data, Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5: Fixed effects regressions for Southwest Airlines 
Variable ln(yield)  (s.e.) ln(pass.)  (s.e.) ln(dep.)  (s.e.) ln(seats)   (s.e.) 
WN Serve -0.109 *** (0.040) 0.222 ** (0.095) 0.255 ** (0.110) 0.278 ** (0.113) 
WN Serve x OliNWC 0.115 ** (0.054) 0.114 (0.124) 0.077 (0.134) 0.056  (0.137) 
WN Serve x OliLCC 0.005 (0.079) -0.119 (0.105) -0.168 (0.116) -0.177  (0.119) 
# LCC w/o WN -0.002 (0.020) 0.065 (0.073) 0.049 (0.071) 0.071  (0.071) 
# Carrier w/o WN -0.021 *** (0.007) 0.168 *** (0.039) 0.198 *** (0.039) 0.185 *** (0.038) 
Avg. plane size 0.000 (0.000) 0.003 * (0.001) -0.005 *** (0.002) 0.004 ** (0.002) 
Unempl. rate (mean) -0.005 *** (0.002) -0.027 *** (0.004) -0.028 *** (0.005) -0.028 *** (0.005) 
Population (mean) 0.007 (0.007) 0.060 ** (0.023) 0.067 *** (0.024) 0.072 *** (0.024) 
Q2 -0.020 *** (0.003) 0.082 *** (0.010) 0.018 *** (0.006) 0.018 *** (0.006) 
Q3 -0.074 *** (0.006) 0.032 ** (0.015) 0.009 (0.008) 0.011  (0.008) 
Q4 -0.030 *** (0.004) -0.010 (0.011) 0.002 (0.008) 0.002  (0.008) 
Year -0.011 *** (0.004) 0.000 (0.012) -0.009 (0.013) -0.011  (0.013) 
Constant 24.924 *** (7.256) 9.445 (23.686) 22.665 (26.326) 29.455  (25.018) 
          
Observations 4609 4609 4609 4609 
Routes 163 163 163 163 
R² within/betw./total 0.151/0.001/0.008 0.196/0.030/0.027 0.278/0.033/0.013 0.210/0.031/0.023 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ 
calculations. 
 
Table 6: Fixed effects regressions for JetBlue Airways 
Variable ln(yield)  (s.e.) ln(pass.)  (s.e.) ln(dep.) (s.e.) ln(seats)  (s.e.) 
B6 Serve -0.114 *** (0.020) 0.400 *** (0.094) 0.362 *** (0.061) 0.425 *** (0.094) 
B6 Serve x OliNWC 0.056 (0.040) -0.212 ** (0.103) -0.203 ** (0.078) -0.218 ** (0.104) 
B6 Serve x OliLCC 0.164 *** (0.046) -0.417 *** (0.110) -0.271 ** (0.123) -0.335 ** (0.139) 
# LCC w/o B6 -0.006 (0.026) -0.017 (0.059) -0.049 (0.063) -0.034 (0.064) 
# Carrier w/o B6 -0.015 (0.012) 0.193 *** (0.040) 0.213 *** (0.044) 0.212 *** (0.043) 
Avg. plane size -0.002 *** (0.000) 0.007 *** (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 0.005 *** (0.001) 
Unempl. rate (mean) -0.013 *** (0.004) -0.041 *** (0.006) -0.039 *** (0.006) -0.039 *** (0.006) 
Population (mean) -0.042 *** (0.015) 0.155 ** (0.066) 0.196 *** (0.068) 0.182 *** (0.068) 
Q2 -0.004 (0.008) 0.059 ** (0.025) -0.005 (0.020) -0.003 (0.020) 
Q3 -0.053 *** (0.012) 0.039 (0.039) -0.036 (0.033) -0.032 (0.033) 
Q4 -0.004 (0.008) -0.011 (0.023) -0.032 * (0.019) -0.027 (0.019) 
Year 0.030 *** (0.010) -0.013 (0.035) -0.047 (0.035) -0.038 (0.035) 
Constant -54.887 *** (19.674) 24.977 (64.227) 86.028 (65.007) 72.053 (65.262) 
          
Observations 1342 1342 1342 1342 
Routes 79 79 79 79 
R² within/betw./total 0.164/0.001/0.002 0.353/0.128/0.112 0.323/0.101/0.079 0.336/0.129/0.115 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ 
calculations. 
33 
 
Table 7: Fixed effects regressions for AirTran Airways 
Variable ln(yield)  (s.e.) ln(pass.)  (s.e.) ln(dep.) (s.e.) ln(seats)  (s.e.) 
FL Serve -0.181 *** (0.031) 0.512 *** (0.073) 0.447 *** (0.072) 0.502 *** (0.071) 
FL Serve x OliNWC 0.001 (0.058) -0.143 (0.094) -0.137 (0.091) -0.153 * (0.092) 
FL Serve x OliLCC 0.157 *** (0.037) -0.135 (0.096) -0.061 (0.101) -0.124 (0.100) 
# LCC w/o FL -0.100 *** (0.033) 0.117 (0.100) 0.054 (0.080) 0.092 (0.082) 
# Carrier w/o FL -0.061 *** (0.016) 0.255 *** (0.045) 0.276 *** (0.038) 0.275 *** (0.041) 
Avg. plane size 0.000 (0.000) 0.008 *** (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.008 *** (0.001) 
Unempl. rate (mean) -0.012 *** (0.002) -0.017 *** (0.006) -0.021 *** (0.005) -0.020 *** (0.005) 
Population (mean) 0.006 (0.008) -0.020 (0.020) -0.028 * (0.015) -0.014 (0.017) 
Q2 -0.024 *** (0.004) 0.064 *** (0.016) -0.014 (0.013) -0.009 (0.013) 
Q3 -0.102 *** (0.007) 0.029 (0.024) -0.026 (0.020) -0.017 (0.020) 
Q4 -0.059 *** (0.004) 0.017 (0.015) 0.000 (0.013) 0.003 (0.013) 
Year -0.016 *** (0.005) 0.048 *** (0.017) 0.043 *** (0.014) 0.034 ** (0.015) 
Constant 35.779 *** (10.563) -84.794 (34.142) -78.222 (26.938) -57.915 (28.736) 
          
Observations 3907 3925 3925 3925 
Routes 159 159 159 159 
R² within/betw./total 0.286/0.043/0.073 0.265/0.050/0.045 0.236/0.011/0.023 0.290/0.107/0.110 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ 
calculations. 
 
Table 8: Fixed effects regressions for Spirit Airlines 
Variable ln(yield)  (s.e.) ln(pass.)  (s.e.) ln(dep.) (s.e.) ln(seats)  (s.e.) 
NK Serve -0.117 *** (0.035) 0.441 *** (0.103) 0.438 *** (0.098) 0.450 *** (0.097) 
NK Serve x OliNWC 0.028 (0.051) -0.145 (0.120) -0.136 (0.115) -0.123 (0.114) 
NK Serve x OliLCC 0.099 *** (0.034) -0.525 *** (0.103) -0.462 *** (0.098) -0.491 *** (0.099) 
# LCC w/o NK 0.011 (0.031) 0.001 (0.105) 0.008 (0.102) 0.032 (0.103) 
# Carrier w/o NK -0.049 ** (0.023) 0.333 *** (0.063) 0.313 *** (0.055) 0.333 *** (0.059) 
Avg. plane size -0.002 ** (0.001) 0.010 *** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.011 *** (0.002) 
Unempl. rate (mean) -0.009 ** (0.004) -0.008 (0.010) -0.005 (0.010) -0.002 (0.010) 
Population (mean) -0.005 (0.012) 0.067 ** (0.028) 0.110 *** (0.028) 0.097 *** (0.028) 
Q2 -0.041 *** (0.008) 0.024 (0.044) -0.023 (0.039) -0.020 (0.038) 
Q3 -0.131 *** (0.016) -0.006 (0.058) -0.053 (0.049) -0.042 (0.049) 
Q4 -0.061 *** (0.007) -0.059 * (0.034) -0.055 * (0.030) -0.050 (0.030) 
Year -0.019 *** (0.007) -0.021 (0.017) -0.050 *** (0.016) -0.044 ** (0.017) 
Constant 41.073 *** (13.046) 47.338 (32.715) 97.987 *** (31.759) 90.816 (32.503) 
          
Observations 1332 1332 1332 1332 
Routes 44 44 44 44 
R² within/betw./total 0.271/0.322/0.315 0.319/0.118/0.189 0.271/0.033/0.070 0.391/0.083/0.144 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ 
calculations. 
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Table 9: Fixed effects regressions for American Airlines 
Variable ln(yield)  (s.e.) ln(pass.)  (s.e.) ln(dep.) (s.e.) ln(seats)  (s.e.) 
AA Serve -0.030 (0.026) 0.262 *** (0.093) 0.303 *** (0.092) 0.304 *** (0.088) 
AA Serve x OliNWC 0.041 (0.044) -0.156 (0.109) -0.177 (0.114) -0.177 (0.111) 
AA Serve x OliLCC -0.033 (0.032) 0.190 * (0.112) 0.184 (0.114) 0.185 * (0.108) 
# LCC w/o AA -0.122 *** (0.025) 0.048 (0.100) -0.014 (0.090) 0.018 (0.090) 
# Carrier w/o AA -0.042 *** (0.013) 0.239 *** (0.050) 0.238 *** (0.049) 0.246 *** (0.050) 
Avg. plane size -0.001 ** (0.000) 0.007 *** (0.002) -0.003 (0.002) 0.008 *** (0.002) 
Unempl. rate (mean) -0.008 *** (0.003) -0.028 *** (0.007) -0.022 *** (0.007) -0.021 *** (0.007) 
Population (mean) 0.013 (0.010) 0.121 *** (0.035) 0.117 *** (0.034) 0.120 *** (0.033) 
Q2 -0.013 *** (0.004) 0.143 *** (0.014) 0.031 *** (0.010) 0.032 *** (0.010) 
Q3 -0.043 *** (0.008) 0.134 *** (0.022) 0.034 ** (0.016) 0.035 ** (0.016) 
Q4 -0.035 *** (0.005) 0.030 * (0.015) -0.019 (0.013) -0.018 (0.012) 
Year -0.019 *** (0.006) -0.047 *** (0.016) -0.059 *** (0.015) -0.062 *** (0.015) 
Constant 41.012 *** (11.097) 98.242 *** (30.976) 119.711 *** (28.332) 129.162 *** (29.588) 
          
Observations 3745 3748 3748 3748 
Routes 123 123 123 123 
R² within/betw./total 0.228/0.001/0.004 0.291/0.163/0.153 0.227/0.119/0.099 0.341/0.159/0.151 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ 
calculations. 
 
Table 10: Fixed effects regressions for Delta Air Lines 
Variable ln(yield)  (s.e.) ln(pass.)  (s.e.) ln(dep.) (s.e.) ln(seats)  (s.e.) 
DL Serve -0.038 * (0.021) 0.254 *** (0.089) 0.270 *** (0.076) 0.307 *** (0.082) 
DL Serve x OliNWC 0.043 (0.050) -0.042 (0.153) 0.043 (0.129) -0.006 (0.143) 
DL Serve x OliLCC -0.063 * (0.036) 0.110 (0.195) 0.091 (0.201) 0.088 (0.209) 
# LCC w/o DL -0.044 (0.031) 0.060 (0.110) 0.059 (0.105) 0.065 (0.108) 
# Carrier w/o DL -0.015 (0.016) 0.428 *** (0.081) 0.440 *** (0.081) 0.444 *** (0.083) 
Avg. plane size -0.001 ** (0.000) 0.007 *** (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) 0.008 *** (0.002) 
Unempl. rate (mean) -0.004 (0.004) -0.035 *** (0.010) -0.028 *** (0.010) -0.028 *** (0.010) 
Population (mean) -0.007 (0.015) 0.028 (0.040) 0.042 (0.038) 0.032 (0.040) 
Q2 -0.022 *** (0.006) 0.081 *** (0.021) -0.004 (0.016) -0.004 (0.016) 
Q3 -0.092 *** (0.010) 0.033 (0.032) -0.029 (0.028) -0.025 (0.028) 
Q4 -0.060 *** (0.006) 0.017 (0.023) -0.020 (0.020) -0.016 (0.020) 
Year -0.010 (0.008) 0.025 (0.020) -0.002 (0.017) 0.006 (0.019) 
Constant 24.201 (15.337) -41.402 (37.365) 6.958 (33.165) -4.637 (35.532) 
          
Observations 3196 3215 3215 3215 
Routes 100 100 100 100 
R² within/betw./total 0.116/0.008/0.004 0.173/0.181/0.141 0.173/0.079/0.052 0.184/0.197/0.151 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ 
calculations. 
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Table 11: Fixed effects regressions for United Airlines 
Variable ln(yield)  (s.e.) ln(pass.)  (s.e.) ln(dep.) (s.e.) ln(seats)  (s.e.) 
UA Serve 0.028 (0.065) 0.236 *** (0.065) 0.307 *** (0.072) 0.320 *** (0.075) 
UA Serve x OliNWC -0.028 (0.055) 0.228 * (0.131) 0.176 (0.146) 0.177 (0.152) 
UA Serve x OliLCC 0.011 (0.055) 0.026 (0.127) -0.028 (0.115) -0.041 (0.122) 
# LCC w/o UA -0.300 *** (0.093) -0.007 (0.137) -0.121 (0.149) -0.085 (0.148) 
# Carrier w/o UA -0.038 (0.037) 0.366 ** (0.138) 0.401 *** (0.142) 0.425 *** (0.145) 
Avg. plane size -0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.003) -0.006 ** (0.003) 0.003 (0.003) 
Unempl. rate (mean) -0.015 ** (0.007) -0.049 *** (0.009) -0.039 *** (0.009) -0.043 *** (0.009) 
Population (mean) -0.015 (0.029) 0.050 (0.037) 0.051 (0.042) 0.055 (0.043) 
Q2 -0.013 (0.010) 0.117 *** (0.036) 0.060 ** (0.026) 0.054 * (0.028) 
Q3 -0.034 ** (0.015) 0.157 *** (0.056) 0.094 ** (0.044) 0.089 * (0.044) 
Q4 -0.041 *** (0.011) 0.009 (0.041) -0.001 (0.035) -0.005 (0.035) 
Year 0.000 (0.016) -0.010 (0.021) -0.027 (0.022) -0.028 (0.024) 
Constant 5.082 (30.488) 27.761 (40.722) 57.271 (40.897) 62.935 (45.629) 
          
Observations 1157 1160 1160 1160 
Routes 37 37 37 37 
R² within/betw./total 0.229/0.005/0.025 0.241/0.184/0.124 0.305/0.168/0.110 0.282/0.216/0.147 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ 
calculations. 
 
Table 12: Fixed effects regressions for US Airways 
Variable ln(yield)  (s.e.) ln(pass.)  (s.e.) ln(dep.) (s.e.) ln(seats)  (s.e.) 
US Serve -0.062 * (0.034) 0.274 * (0.151) 0.328 ** (0.147) 0.342 ** (0.144) 
US Serve x OliNWC -0.002 (0.030) -0.028 (0.141) -0.079 (0.145) -0.062 (0.139) 
US Serve x OliLCC 0.021 (0.053) -0.130 (0.147) -0.166 (0.144) -0.175 (0.143) 
# LCC w/o US -0.084 *** (0.031) 0.370 * (0.214) 0.298 (0.189) 0.330 * (0.196) 
# Carrier w/o US -0.035 ** (0.017) 0.146 * (0.080) 0.153 ** (0.073) 0.140 * (0.075) 
Avg. plane size 0.000 (0.001) 0.004 ** (0.002) -0.004 ** (0.002) 0.006 *** (0.002) 
Unempl. rate (mean) -0.010 *** (0.003) -0.028 *** (0.010) -0.030 *** (0.012) -0.031 *** (0.011) 
Population (mean) 0.001 (0.018) -0.074 ** (0.032) -0.071 * (0.037) -0.071 ** (0.035) 
Q2 -0.028 *** (0.005) 0.105 *** (0.019) 0.015 (0.012) 0.020 * (0.012) 
Q3 -0.065 *** (0.007) 0.049 * (0.026) -0.010 (0.018) -0.004 (0.017) 
Q4 -0.038 *** (0.006) 0.009 (0.021) -0.019 (0.017) -0.021 (0.017) 
Year -0.016 (0.014) 0.080 *** (0.026) 0.074 ** (0.030) 0.073 ** (0.028) 
Constant 34.468 (26.445) -147.080 *** (52.042) -138.461 ** (58.373) -133.473 ** (56.050) 
          
Observations 1829 1831 1831 1831 
Routes 105 105 105 105 
R² within/betw./total 0.155/0.112/0.165 0.174/0.066/0.085 0.224/0.118/0.178 0.184/0.080/0.115 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Sources: U.S. DOT, T-100 Domestic Segment Data and Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), authors’ 
calculations. 
 
